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In  this  paper,  I  would  like  to  put  forward  the  claim that,  at  least  in  some central  cases, 
visualising consists literally in imagining seeing.1 The first section of my paper is concerned 
with a defence of the specific argument for this claim that M. G. F. Martin presents in his  
paper  The  Transparency  of  Experience  (Martin  2002). This  argument  has  been  often 
misunderstood (or ignored), and it is worthwhile to discuss it in detail and to illus trate what its 
precise nature is and why I take it to be sound.2 In the second section, I present a second and 
independent argument for the claim that  visualising is imagining seeing, which is not to be 
found in Martin's writings, despite some crucial similarities with his own argument ‒ notably 
in  the focus  on the subjective  aspects of visual  experience.  The last  section deals with a 
particular objection to the idea that imagining takes perception as its direct object and says a 
bit more about how best to understand this claim.
* Email: fabian.dorsch@uclmail.net — Website: www.ideengeschichten.de
1 Some philosophers ‒ notably Peacocke (1985) and O’Shaughnessy (2000): ch. 12 ‒ have put forward stronger versions of 
this claim, extending it to imagining in other sense modalities, and to  all instances of the various forms of sensory 
imagining. Martin is clearly sympathetic with this more general conclusion, as can be witnessed in Martin (2002, 404f.),  
as well as Martin (2001). See also Dorsch (2010) for further discussion.
2 The various objections, that have been raised against Martin's argument in the literature, are discussed and rejected in  
Dorsch (2010) and Dorsch (2012a, section 10.3). Here,  I also ignore the fact that Martin’s argument for the claim that 
some instances of visualising are instances of imagining seeing forms part of a wider argument against intentionalist ‒  
and for certain disjunctivist ‒ theories of perception.  In particular, I show in Dorsch (2010) that Martin's argument  ‒ 
although  sound ‒ is unable to fulfil the role originally intended for it by Martin: namely to undermine intentionalism 
about perceptual experiences and their phenomenal character. Indeed, I use Martin's argument to illustrate that a certain 
non-traditional version of intentionalism, which takes perceptual experiences to be self-reflexive, should be preferred  
over Martin's form of  phenomenal disjunctivism and is in fact compatible with  structural disjunctivism, according to 
which perceptions and hallucinations differ essentially not in their phenomenal character, but in their non-phenomenal  
structure (see also Dorsch 2012b). 
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1. Martin’s Argument
The idea that visualising consists at least sometimes in imagining seeing is a special case of 
Martin’s more general Dependency Thesis about all forms of the sensory imagination:3 
[T]o imagine sensorily a φ  is to imagine experiencing a φ  [.] (Martin (2002): 404)
What we are thereby said to be aware of when imagining a perceptual experience is just that:  
some experience. More specifically, we are aware of the first-personal side of an experience, 
that is, of its phenomenal character (i.e.,  what the experience is like for the subject).4 We 
imagine some experience by imagining some instantiation of its character. Its third-personal 
side (if  experiences have any) is,  so to speak, ‘invisible’ to object-directed imagining. Of 
course, we can have additional thoughts about it. But it is not presented as part of a case of 
imagining with an experience as its object. The reason for this is that this form of imagining is 
experiential (or phenomenal), in the same sense in which seeing and visualising are visual. 
Just as the latter are limited to the presentation of visible entities, imagining an experience ‒ 
or  experiential  imagining,  as  I  will  say  ‒ is  restricted  to  the  presentation of  phenomenal 
aspects  of  mental  episodes.  The  latter’s  non-phenomenal  features  of  episodes  lack  an 
‘experiential appearance’, so to speak. Again, experiential awareness does not differ in this 
respect from, say, visual awareness. When we see or visualise a lemon, we see or visualise its 
visual appearance, but not its biological nature, for example. 
Intentionalists typically select the Dependency Thesis as the main target of their criticism 
of Martin’s related argument against intentionalism. Indeed, if imaginative experience is to be 
understood in the same intentional terms as perceptual experience, it is difficult to understand 
why, say, seeing and visualising should not make us aware of the same objects, namely ex-
ternal  things.  If  perception  does  not  involve  an  awareness  of  an experience,  why should 
imagination do so, if both are assumed to involve the same kind of intentional awareness? 
3 Note that Martin uses ‘experience’ here as short for ‘sense experience’, such as perception or bodily sensation. My own 
use is less narrow in also including, say, visualising or other imaginative instances of sensory awareness (e.g., auditory  
imagining).
4 See,  for  instance,  Nagel  (1974)  and Williamson (1990)  for  more  or  less  the same characterisations  of  phenomenal  
character.
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This doubt should be taken serious ‒ not the least because it simply confirms that there is in  
fact  a tension between the intentionalist  thesis and the Dependency Thesis.  While Martin 
draws the conclusion that the former should be given up, it is also very plausible to question 
the latter. 
Some of the intentionalist objections, however, seem to have misunderstood the nature of 
Martin’s argument for the Dependency Thesis. What is crucial here is that it concentrates on, 
and exploits the special features of, cases in which our episodes of visualising involve certain 
subjective  properties.  Subjective  properties  are  characterised  by  the  fact  that  they  are 
experience-dependent:  their  instantiation  is  dependent  on  the  occurrence  of  a  specific 
experience.  Martin’s focus  is  on instances  of  visualising  which  involve  a  certain  kind of 
perspectivalness. Accordingly, the conclusion of his argument should be understood as being 
restricted  to  those  cases  (or  to  similar  cases,  such  as  imaginative  experiences  involving 
aspects of painfulness or itchiness). What it therefore claims is that visualising is identical 
with  imagining  perceiving  when  it  involves  the  subjective  perspectival  element  at  issue. 
Perhaps sensory imaginings are generally perspectival in this way. But, if not, the argument 
fails to establish the Dependency Thesis for all of them.
So, what is the kind of perspectivalness at issue? By perceiving an object, we may acquire 
knowledge about the latter’s specific spatial location. But our perception does not thereby 
place the object in objective space. When we look at a building that is located roughly to the 
South-East of the bench on which we are currently sitting, we do not see it as being to the 
South-East  of that bench. In particular,  we do not  perceive objects  as being orientated in 
accordance with the cardinal  directions. Instead,  we see them as being orientated towards 
ourselves ‒ for instance, we see the building as being to our left. What this means is that we 
perceive objects as part of egocentric space, and not as part of objective (or ‘absolute’) space.5 
One manifestation of this fact is that our perception of the building inclines and entitles us to 
judge that it is to our actual left, but not that it is to the South-East of the bench. Coming to 
5 It does not really matter for Martin’s main argument whether we are concerned here with two different sets of spatial  
properties of objects (e.g., one objective, and the other subjective), or instead with two modes of presentation of one and  
the  same  set.  What  is  relevant  here  is  primarily  the  fact  that  our  perceptual  access  to  spatially  located  objects  is  
perspectival and, in particular, presents them as orientated towards us, rather than in more objective terms. But many of  
the points involved in the argument can be described more easily by reference to egocentric properties. Besides, the  
postulation of subjective orientations is not much different from the postulation of subjective modes of presentation (see  
the similar issue raised below with respect to the aspect of leftishness and similar phenomenal aspects).
3
Fabian Dorsch Visualising as Imagining Seeing
know  the  latter  requires  additional  information  ‒  notably  about  our  own  location  and 
orientation in objective space (see Campbell (1994): especially ch. 4). 
None the less, our perceptions of egocentric locations are still as much concerned with 
actual space as is our knowledge of objective locations. We see the building as being to our 
actual left, as part of our actual environment. If this were not so, our experience would not be 
able to provide us with all the information necessary to properly interact with what we see ‒ 
for  example,  to  succeed in  walking over  to  the  actual  building.  But  that  perception  does 
provide us with this information is illustrated by the fact that such interaction does not require 
inferring the presence of the building to our actual left from perceiving it as being to our left  
and believing that such experiences are (typically) concerned with the actual world. The issue 
of which world our perceptions are concerned with simply does not arise ‒ it is our world, the 
world  in  which  we perceive.  Something similar  is  true  of  the  temporal  relevance  of  our 
perceptions: they concern our present environment. We see the building as presently being to 
our left, and not as having been there in the past, or as going to be there in the future.6 
Part of our perception of the building as being to our actual left is implicit, however. We do 
not explicitly experience ourselves and our spatial relation to the building when perceiving the 
latter. We are not among the entities presented to us by our experience. Of course, we can see 
other perceivers ‒ and even ourselves, say, by utilising a mirror or some similar apparatus 
which turns us into the object of our own perceptions. But normally, when we are simply 
subjects of perception and perceive the orientation of objects relative to us, we do not see us, 
but  only  the  objects.  Our  own  perspective  is  only  implicitly  reflected  in  our  perceptual 
experiences, namely as the point of view orientated to which objects are presented to us. As a 
consequence, what figures explicitly in our experience is not the relational property of being 
to the left of us, but the monadic quality of being leftish. 
It seems that such a quality can figure in perception in two different ways. The perceptual 
experience may instantiate the quality; or it may instead present an external object as having 
that  quality.  In  both  cases,  this  has  consequences  for  the  phenomenal  character  of  the 
experience concerned. In the first case, the quality constitutes one of the non-presentational 
aspects of that character.  In the second case,  it  is  a constituent  of  one of the character’s 
6 In what follows, I concentrate on the fact that perceptions present objects in actual space and mention the temporal  
dimension only when it becomes relevant.
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presentational aspects.7 That the quality of leftishness figures in our perception of the building 
therefore  means  that  the  latter  instantiates  a  certain  character  aspect  ‒  either  a  non-
presentational  aspect,  or  the presentational  aspect  of  presenting the  building as  being the 
monadic property of being to the left.8 
Which view is to be preferred in the end does not matter here. Indeed, it is not so clear  
whether they actually differ in any substantial way ‒ which might explain why Martin appears 
to switch between both views in some of his formulations (e.g., when talking about the quality 
of itchiness). The step from acknowledging the presence of a non-presentational aspect of the 
character of a perception to projecting this aspect onto the perceived object is indeed small ‒ 
as discussions about blur or similar phenomena illustrate (see, for instance, Peacocke (1983), 
as well as Soldati & Dorsch (2011)). Moreover, any presentation of something as being leftish 
would lack the status and force of the presentation of it as being to our actual and present left.  
In particular, we do not see the building as having the monadic property of being to the left; 
and we are not inclined or entitled to believe it  to  genuinely instantiate  this property.  Of 
course, we may say ‘the building is to the left’. But when prompted, we will happily clarify 
that what we really meant was that it is to the left of us. 
In any case, that the character of our perception of the building include this phenomenal 
aspect ‒ let us call it the aspect of leftishness ‒ should not be doubted. We can attend to it; and 
we can exploit it when drawing a picture of how the building looks like when seen from our 
current point of view. That is, we can depict an object as being to our actual left by drawing it  
on the left side of the canvas ‒ instead of, say, by drawing both ourselves and the object.9 
But how is the instantiation of the aspect of leftishness linked to the perception of the  
property of something as being at some specific location to our actual left? More generally, 
how  does  the  perspectivalness  of  an  experience  relate  to  the  determination  of  what  is 
7 It should become clear very shortly that there is a third possibility: the experience may represent another experience as  
instantiating or presenting the quality.
8 Using the expression ‘being to the left’ to denote a monadic property is not ideal, since this expression clearly has some 
connotations of relationality. But it  is  not easy to come up with another formulation, without altogether loosing the  
connection to the perceived property of being to our actual left. I am grateful to one of the referees for making me aware  
of this issue.
9 Very similar issues arise, for instance, with respect to the status of the quality of ovalness ‒ another perspectival aspect of  
perception ‒ which figures in our experience when we are looking at objects from an angle and perceive them as round.  
Again,  we typically  draw round objects  by tracing elliptical  shapes on the canvas.  But  it  is  debatable  whether  our  
experiences present round objects as elliptical in addition to presenting them as round (see, for instance, Peacocke’s  
discussion (1983) of what  he calls  sensational  properties).  One significant  difference from egocentric  orientation is,  
however, that, while roundness is an objective property, being to the left of us is not.
5
Fabian Dorsch Visualising as Imagining Seeing
experienced? Martin’s  insightful  observation is  that the  former suffices for the  latter  (see 
Martin (2002): 410). If an experience of an object exemplifies leftishness ‒ that is, shows a 
respective non-presentational phenomenal aspect or, alternatively, presents the object as being 
to the left ‒ then it is an experience of the object as being to our actual left. More specifically, 
the presence of the perspectival aspect of leftishness is  sufficient to ensure,  first,  that  the 
experience concerned is an experience of something as being to our  left (rather than to our 
right) and, second, that it is an experience of something as being to our actual left (rather than 
to our left in a merely possible situation). Indeed, Martin claims even more, namely that it 
also suffices for having a perceptual experience of something as being to our actual left. This 
makes sense since the other two kinds of visual experience, which may involve the aspect of 
leftishness, are not ‒ or at  least  not in their simplest  forms ‒ concerned with our current 
environment.  Episodes  of  visualising  present  objects  as  part  of  imagined  situations  (see 
below), while episodes of visual memory present objects as part of past situations. I return 
below to the issue of how important this additional claim is for Martin’s argument. 
That the instantiation of the aspect of leftishness turns the respective experience into an 
experience of something to our actual left is a direct consequence of the implicitness involved 
in our perception of the spatial relations that objects bear to us in egocentric space. As noted 
above, we see objects  as being to our actual  left  (and not,  say, as being at  an egocentric 
location in some merely possible space). But this relational property is typically not explicitly 
given  to  us.  Instead,  what  figures  in  our  experience  is  solely  the  monadic  quality  of 
leftishness. Hence, we perceive the instantiation of the property of being to our actual left 
simply by being aware of the quality of leftishness. When we see the building as being to our 
actual left, no aspect of our perception but its aspect of leftishness plays a role in determining 
that we experience the building at  that specific location in our actual environment. If the 
aspect  of  leftishness  is  taken  to  be  presentational,  this  thought  becomes  even  more 
straightforward:  our  perception  presents  the  building  as  being  to  our  actual  left  just  by 
presenting it as being to the left; no other presentational element is needed or involved. What 
we are confronted with here is the particular subjectivity of the aspect of leftishness. Its actual 
instantiation is both necessary and sufficient for the experience of something as being to our 
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actual left.10 
However, as Martin notes, these considerations about perception give rise to a puzzle in the 
case of visualising (see Martin (2002): 410). On the one hand, our episodes of visualising 
involve the same kind of perspectivalness as our episodes of seeing (see Hopkins (1998): ch. 
7). We visualise buildings as being to the left of certain subjective points of view. And we 
normally do so without explicitly presenting those points of view or any subjects occupying 
them. What figures in our respective imaginative experiences is therefore, again, the monadic 
quality of leftishness, and not the relational property of being to the left of some subject in the 
subject’s environment. But this means that our episodes of visualising may involve the same 
phenomenal aspect of leftishness as our episodes of seeing. Indeed, this is partly due to the 
relative simplicity of our visual presentation of the egocentric orientations of objects. It is 
devoid of  any explicit  reference to  the subject  of experience  and, therefore,  allows us  to 
visualise something as being to the left without thereby visualising it as being to the left of 
any particular subject. 
On the other hand, when visualising buildings as being to the left of subjective points of 
views, we need not ‒ and typically do not ‒ imagine them as being to our actual left. At least  
in the simplest cases, our episodes of visualising do not locate their objects in our actual 
environment, but instead in some imagined space (see Sartre (1940): 8ff., and Wittgenstein 
(1984): sec. 622 and 628).11 Of course, we can project our image onto our actual environment 
by  taking  what  we  imagine  to  be  part  of  actual  space.  But  even  then,  there  is  no  real 
competition between what we see and what we visualise. For example, when looking at a 
certain picture on our kitchen wall, we may visualise with open eyes how things would look if 
there were a different picture at the same spot on the wall. But such a complex and mixed 
presentation  does  not  amount  to  a  presentation  of  the  impossible  state  of  affairs  of  two 
pictures occupying the same part of space. 
So,  episodes  of  visualising  may  involve  the  aspect  of  leftishness  without  presenting 
10 Of course, Martin cannot assume in his argument that an experience’s instantiation of the aspect of leftishness is also  
sufficient for the existence of something to our actual left. This would follow only if the experience is a perception, and if  
perceptions are always factive ‒ something that intentionalists deny.
11 There is also the issue of whether visualising always locates objects relative to us (understood as part of the imagined  
situation), or rather to some other imagined subject. The default case seems to be that we visualise objects as orientated  
towards ourselves (i.e., our point of view within the imagined world), and that imaginative projects involving imagined  
subjects different from us require the additional identification of our imagined point of view with that of those other  
subjects (see Wollheim (1984) and Martin (2002a): 411).
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something as being to our actual left. But due to the subjectivity of the aspect of leftishness 
noted  above,  its  instantiation  is  inseparably  linked  to  the  presentation  of  something  as 
possessing  the  relational  property  of  being  to  our  actual  left.  Hence,  the  instances  of 
visualising concerned cannot exemplify the aspect of leftishness. This raises the question of 
how it is involved in visualising instead. Martin’s proposal is that, in visualising, we imagine 
an experience as instantiating the aspect of leftishness ‒ that is, we imagine a perspectival 
experience of something as being to the left in the imagined situation. When we visualise a 
building  as  being  to  the  left,  our  imaginative  episode  does  not  instantiate  the  aspect  of 
leftishness. But it still involves the latter by representing another experience as instantiating it. 
The proposal captures the specific subjectivity of the aspect of leftishness. For it takes the 
instantiation  of  that  aspect  in  a  certain  world to  be  sufficient  for  the  occurrence  of  an 
experience of something as being located to the experiencing subject’s left in that very same 
world.  Actual  perspectival  experiences  concern  actual  space,  while  imagined perspectival 
experiences concern imagined space. Moreover, what needs to be imagined is a perceptual 
experience. As noted above, other perspectival experiences are not concerned with the current 
state of the world in which they themselves occur. Instead, they are concerned with the past of 
that world (as in the case of visual recall), or with an entirely different possible world (as in 
the  case  of  visualising).  Hence,  neither  episodic memories,  nor  imaginative  episodes  can 
instantiate the subjective aspect of leftishness. If we want to imagine an experience with that 
aspect, we therefore have to imagine a perspectival perception. This conclusion can also be 
inferred  more  directly  from Martin’s  additional  claim  mentioned  above,  namely  that  the 
presence  of  leftishness  suffices  for  the  presence  of  perception.  Indeed,  the  reasoning put 
forward in support of that claim has been very similar to the one rehearsed in the second half 
of this paragraph. But, strictly speaking, the additional claim does not seem to be necessary 
for Martin’s argument. 
Martin further illustrates this argument by comparing the subjective perspectivalness of 
perceptions to the subjective aspects involved in some bodily sensations. His example are 
experiences of itchiness;  but experiences of pain are equally good candidates (see Dorsch 
(2012a): sections 11.5 and 14.3).12 Experiences of itch instantiate the phenomenal aspect of 
12 Nothing here depends on whether the presented view on itches and sensations of itch (or the comparable view on pains  
and pain experiences) is correct. The analogy is merely meant to further illustrate Martin’s treatment of the involvement  
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itchiness: they are sensations of itch. Moreover, having a sensation of itch is sufficient for 
there actually being an itch and, hence, for experiencing an actual itch. If we sense an itch at a 
certain location on our skin, then that part of our skin does indeed itch ‒ independently of 
whether there is any skin irritation, say. By contrast, merely imagining our skin as itching 
does not involve the presentation of an actual  itch.  In particular,  it  does not  induce us to 
scratch the respective part of our skin. But this raises, again, the question of how imagining an 
itch  can  still  involve  the  phenomenal  aspect  of  itchiness  ‒  which  it  clearly  does,  albeit 
possibly  to  a  lesser  degree  of  intensity  and  determinacy  than  real  feelings  of  itch.  For, 
otherwise, imagined itches would not phenomenally resemble genuine itches and, moreover, 
be classified as imagined  itches in the first  place.  As above, the solution is to understand 
imagining an itch as imagining a sensation of itch ‒ that is, as imagining an experience which 
instantiates the phenomenal aspect of itchiness. This concludes what are, in essence, Martin’s 
considerations in favour of the truth of the Dependency Thesis, as limited to some central 
cases of visualising.
2. A Second Argument
However, the analogy with itch (or the similar analogy with pain) suggests a second route to 
the  conclusion  that  visualising  the  orientation  of  objects  in  egocentric  space  requires 
imagining perceiving that orientation. Feeling an itch is not only sufficient for the existence of 
itch, it is also necessary for the latter. Our skin does not really itch if we do not feel itch. Of  
course, other things may distract us so that we do not always notice the itch. But if we do not  
feel any itch at some location on our skin, despite being sufficiently attentive to the latter, it 
does not seem true to say that that part of the skin in fact itches. In particular, by-standers  
cannot insist that we sense an itch by pointing to some irritation of our skin. Such evidence 
cannot trump our failure to feel  an itch.  Accordingly,  the presence of an itch requires an 
experience  of  that  itch  ‒  and,  presumably,  as  part  of  the  same  (actual)  world.  Hence, 
imagining an itch has to involve imagining sensing that itch. 
Now, egocentric orientational properties seem to be similarly subjective ‒ opening up the 
of subjective elements in imaginative experience.
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possibility of formulating a similar argument in favour of the Dependency Thesis with respect 
to visualising. Martin does not discuss this second route to the conclusion; and it is not clear 
whether  he  would  accept  the  subjectivity  of  egocentric  orientations,  or  the  argument 
exploiting it. But even if not, it is still worthwhile to discuss both. When we see a building as 
being to our left, it does not possess this orientation independently of being perceived by us as 
having it. Certainly, the objective location of the building comes with the disposi tion of giving 
rise to a perception of leftishness when viewed from a position to its North-West by a normal 
human being with a normal orientation in objective space (e.g., standing on his feet, etc.) who 
faces South. But its perceived property of being to our left cannot simply be reduced to this 
objective disposition. Instead, the instantiation of this egocentric orientation seems to depend 
on our actual perceptual awareness of it.
For one thing, which dispositional property is correlated to the property of being to the left 
of us varies with changes in our location in objective space. Once we being to move or turn 
around, the building may very well cease to be to our left ‒ though it may also begin to be to 
the left of another person who steps in and takes our previous spot.  The disposition may 
therefore constitute  the property  of  being to  the  left  of  whoever  occupies  the  objectively 
specified location to its North-West with the respective objectively specified orientation. But 
it  does not amount  to the property of being to the left of  us (understood in first-personal 
terms).  This  is  reflected  in  the  more  general  fact  that  egocentric  space  cannot  be  fully 
specified in objective terms ‒ which is why the two are to be distinguished in the first place. 
In particular, what we describe with the expression ‘to our left’ is not a cardinal direction in 
objective space (see Campbell (1994): especially ch. 4). 
Without this lack of strict correlation between egocentric and objective spatial features, it 
would also seem impossible  to  explain why we cannot  suffer  an illusion  with respect  to 
perceiving something as being to our actual  left.  Of course,  when facing South,  we may 
perceive a building as being to our actual left while, in fact, it is located to the South-West of 
our current location in objective space. But, as the previous considerations have indicated, the 
objective orientational properties of the building are neither sufficient, nor necessary for its 
instantiation of any subjective orientational property. What happens in cases like this is just 
that we fail  to track the former by perceiving the latter ‒ an error which is  due to some 
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breakdown in our relation to our environment.13 
But  the  subjectivity  of  egocentric  orientations  has  consequences  for  our  attempts  to 
visualise objects as having them. Objects can possess these subjective features only when they 
are perceived as having them. Furthermore, this is true as much of imagined or other possible 
situations, as it is true of actual ones ‒ assuming that they all contain the same ontological 
kind  of  objects  and  properties.  Finally,  the  dependency  in  question  does  not  range  over 
different  possible  worlds,  but  is  confined  to  a  single  one:  the  perceived  object  and  the 
perception are always part of the same world. Hence, visualising an object as having such an 
experience-dependent  property  requires  imagining  a  suitable  perception  of  that  object. 
Visualising a building as being to the left, for instance, has to involve imagining a perception 
of a building as being to the left. 
3. The Nature of Experiential Imagining
It  should  now  be  easier  to  understand  why  some  of  the  objections  raised  against  the 
considerations in support of the Dependency Thesis about visualising ‒ or, more generally, 
about sensory imagining ‒ have in fact been missing their target. In many cases, this is due to 
the fact that the critics have overlooked or underappreciated the importance of subjectivity in 
the two presented lines of thought. In Dorsch (2010) and Dorsch (2012a, section 10.3),  I 
describe at length why the various objections of Currie and Ravenscroft (2002), Noordhof 
(2002) and  Burge (2005) to the Dependency Thesis fail for precisely this reason. 
Here, I would like to focus solely on the charge that understanding visualising in terms of 
imagining perceiving raises more questions than that it answers. It is worthwhile to note that, 
if  this  charge  is  adequate,  it  poses  a  general  difficulty  for  all  views  about  the  nature  of 
visualising, assuming that the argument concerning the visualisation of egocentric orientations  
goes  through.  But  it  is  true  that  more  needs  to  be  said  about  the  nature  of  experiential  
13 The property of being to our left shares both discussed aspects with the property of being here if ascribed to ourselves.  
The latter, too, cannot be specified in purely objective terms. And we cannot go wrong in being aware of ourselves as  
being here. One difference between our awareness of us as being here and our awareness of other objects as being to our  
left is, however, that the latter may concern hallucinated objects. This is not problematic for the present argument since it  
relies only on the claim that the instantiation of egocentric orientations requires the occurrence of a perception of them,  
but not on the reverse claim. Besides, as suggested in note 11 above, there are perhaps other ways of reconciling the  
subjectivity of a property with the possibility of hallucinating an instance of it.
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imagination  and,  in  particular,  how  it  can  accommodate  certain  important  features  of 
visualising ‒ notably its involvement of a visual  and perspectival  presentation of external 
things, combined with a cognitive attitude. Part of this explanatory challenge can be restated 
by the distinction between the exemplification and the representation of a subjective aspect of 
character. Episodes of seeing exemplify a perceptual character, while episodes of visualising ‒ 
if they amount to experiential imagination ‒ involve the imaginative representation of such a 
character. What then needs explaining is how the proposed kind of representation can ensure 
that the character of representing (i.e., that of visualising) is very similar to the represented 
character  (i.e.,  that  of  seeing)  in  the  mentioned  respects  (i.e.,  visual  presentation, 
perspectivalness and cognitive attitude), without being identical to it. 
In addition to the problems just mentioned, there is obscurity in the explanation provided 
by the Dependency Thesis. It rests upon the idea that the experience is represented in 
imagination. But it is unclear how to cash this out. [...] It is hard not to think that all the 
explanatory  work  is  being  done  by  the  nature  of  imagination  and  the  kind  of 
representation which serves it. (Noordhof (2002): 447)
Noordhof is absolutely right about the last point. But the proposed kind of representation is 
perhaps less mysterious than it might seem to him and others. Consider the reproduction of a 
painting ‒ for instance, a postcard hanging at your wall. This image does not itself amount to  
a  painting  and differs  substantially  from one (e.g.,  it  does  not  involve  paint  and has  no 
perceivable texture). But it none the less inherits important aspects of the reproduced painting. 
Most of all, it depicts the same objects and features, and from the same perspective, as the 
painting. Indeed, if the reproduction is done well, its perspectivalness derives from that of the 
reproduced painting, and not from the perspectivalness of the photographic process involved 
in the reproduction. That is, the impact of the point of view occupied by the lens directed at  
the painting is typically negligible in comparison to the impact of the point of view inherent to  
the photographed depiction.14 Much more can surely be said about how the reproduction does 
14 The process of photo-copying,  which does not involve any such perspective onto the reproduced piece of paper,  is  
perhaps an even better illustration of the kind of representation pertaining to experiential imagination (as proposed by 
Martin in a personal discussion about how best to understand Hume’s Copy Principle; see also Dorsch (2012a): chapter  
9).
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end up presenting  the  same situation  from the  same perspective  as  the  painting.  But  the 
absence of such further elucidations does not render the kind of representation involved in 
photographic reproduction mysterious or completely unilluminating. We accept that this kind 
of  representation exists.  And the description  given above gives us  some grasp of  what  it 
amounts to. In fact, we know at least that the reproduction represents the painting partly by 
representing  the  visual  perspective  of  the  painting;  and  that  it  represents  the  latter’s 
perspective by presenting the same objects and features as they are presented to the point of  
view of the painting. 
Imagining a perception involves the same kind of representation. It represents a perception 
partly by representing the latter’s perspective. And it does this by presenting the same external 
objects  and features  as  they  are  presented  to  the  point  of  view of  such a  perception.  In 
imagining a perception, we thus imagine a possible perceptual perspective onto the world.15 
And, as in the case of the reproduction of a painting, the resulting episode of visualising ends 
up with a character very similar in its visual, perspectival and attitudinal character to that of 
an  episode  of  seeing.  Besides,  we  also  know  that  this  imaginative  representation  of  a 
perceptual perspective constitutes an experiential form of object awareness, which may be 
spelled out in intentional terms ‒ an idea which, incidentally, disjunctivists about perceptions 
may  agree  with.  Although  it  leaves  many  issues  open,  this  characterisation  of  what 
experiential imagining amounts to, and how it can inherit some of the features of the imagined  
experiences, should be illuminating enough to rebut the charge of obscurity. The proposed 
kind  of  representation  is  involved  in  other  phenomena  as  well.  And  we  have  some 
understanding of how it can explain the presence of the important features of reproductions 
and episodes of visualising noted. 
To illustrate  that explanatory power,  it  is  worthwhile  to  have a  brief look at  how this 
account of experiential imagination can answer a challenge raised by Currie and Ravenscroft 
((2002): 28).16 They ask for an account of why it is possible that we may mistake an instance 
15 This idea is not new. In particular, Hume’s Copy Principle may be read as claiming pretty much the same if applied to the 
case of imagining.
16 Reference to the kind of representation at issue promises also to illuminate why episodes of visualising often possess a 
lesser degree of repleteness, determinacy or intensity than episodes of seeing. Just as the reproduction of a painting may  
lead to the loss of some of these qualities, imagining perceiving something may have this effect. Martin’s employment ‒  
in Martin (2001) ‒ of the Dependency Thesis in his account of the phenomenal differences between seeing, visually 
remembering and visualising provides another example of the explanatory force of treating at least some instances of  
visualising as an instance of experiential imagination.
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of seeing for an instance of visualising, or that we may recall something as seen that we have 
merely visualised in the past (e.g., as in the case of fabricated memories). Their suspicion is 
that  the  defenders  of  the  Dependency  Thesis  do  not  have  the  resources  to  identify  the 
underlying similarities, assuming that they have to accept a difference between what we see 
and what we visualise as part of the respective experiences. 
How could we explain, on this hypothesis, why people are prone to misrecall visualising 
as  seeing,  and  in  some  circumstances  will  mistake  perception  for  visualisation?  Ac-
cording to the hypothesis,  visualising an  F has the representational content, not  F, but 
seeing an F. Thus the seeing and  visualising have quite different contents. Why would 
states with such different contents seem to us to be so similar? Content is just one di-
mension of similarity; perhaps states could differ in content and be similar in other ways. 
But the hypothesis offers us no account of what these other similarities might be and how 
they  could,  in  the  face  of  content-dissimilarity,  sustain  the  overall  phenomenological 
similarity that seeing and visualising enjoy. (Currie & Ravenscroft (2002): 28)
One part of the answer to this challenge is to stress that, for a proponent of the Dependency 
Thesis  about  visualising,  there  is  ‒  contrary to  what  Currie  and Ravenscroft  suggest  ‒  a 
substantial overlap in content between seeing and visualising. For imagining a perception of 
an  external  object  involves  the visual  presentation  of  that  object  as  part  of  the imagined 
situation ‒ just as the reproduction depicts whatever is depicted by the reproduced painting. In 
other words, experiential  imagination has two objects: the imagined perceptual experience 
and the external thing presented by that experience (and visualised as part of the instance of 
experiential  imagination  concerned).17 The  other  part  of  the  reply  to  Currie’s  and 
Ravenscroft’s challenge is that, as already illustrated by reference to the analogy with the 
reproduction  of  paintings,  the  presentation  of  external  things  involved  in  imaginatively 
adopting the subjective perspective of a perception shares many important aspects with the 
presentation  of  those  things  involved  in  perceiving  them  from  such  a  perspective. 
Accordingly, seeing and imagining seeing resemble each other, not only in what they make us 
aware of, but also in how they present it to us. This is indeed best explained by reference to 
17 See Dorsch (2010) for more on how both certain disjunctivist and certain intentionalist approaches to perception can 
accommodate the fact that imagining seeing involves two objects of awareness.
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the truth of the Dependency Thesis about visualising, according to which it consists literally 
in imagining seeing.18
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